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In January 1943, as German defeat at Stalingrad loomed, a review of resources
and manpower was carried out in the various departments of the Reich Ministry
for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, with the purpose of stepping up
the ministry’s contribution to the war effort. The operation concentrated on the
lower echelons of the ministry, among which were included the German Central
Conference Of ce (Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale, DKZ), which had been estab-
lished in 1934. The responsibilities of this department included organizing
international conferences in Germany, handling applications for foreign cur-
rency by German participants in international meetings abroad and maintaining
an archive on international organizations. At  rst sight these tasks seemed to
the of cials of the propaganda ministry to have no bearing on the war effort
and hence to be suitable targets for cuts. However, they proved in contemporary
discourse, even in the exceptional circumstances of ‘Total War’, to have an
unexpectedly far-reaching signi cance. According to the civil servant respon-
sible, ‘outwardly the DKZ appears to be an innocuous conference authority,
but in reality it is to a large extent at the disposal of military intelligence’.1
The DKZ itself did all it could to con rm its roˆle in the sphere of intelligence
and espionage, emphasizing its links with the apparatus of repression of the
Third Reich and stating that the Reich Security Central Of ce was ‘kept infor-
med of the political work of the DKZ by carbon-copy procedure’ and that
currency controls were administered in ‘close agreement with the Secret State
Police’. According to its own account, as well as being responsible for the
‘reorganization’ of international organizations relevant to the war, the DKZ
was concerned with the maintenance of relations with neutral foreign states
Work on the DKZ records held at Stanford was made possible by support from the Swiss
National Science Foundation (NFP 42). I am grateful to my colleagues on the project, Sacha
Zala and Amalia Ribi, for lively debates on the DKZ.
1 Central State Archive, ‘Sonderarchiv’ , Moscow (hereafter CHIDK), 1363/1/166: Minis-
terialrat Dr Gast to the Chief of the Propaganda Staff, Berlin, 20.1.1943.
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and with the administration of Belgian organizations.2 Therefore, the DKZ had
a foreign-policy as well as an administrative roˆle.
Historians of National Socialism have not previously paid much attention to
the DKZ,3 even though the Central Conference Of ce is documented in the
standard collections of sources on the Third Reich. Archival sources from and
on the DKZ are located mainly in the  les of the Reich Ministry for Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda4 and in the various editions of captured German
documents containing materials from the propaganda ministry.5 Recently,
moreover, DKZ documents have become accessible in Moscow.6 Of the docu-
ments from the archive and documentation centre of the DKZ—a library which,
during the Second World War, occupied several  oors of a Berlin house—only
a small portion remains, though even this collection  lls 430 boxes in the
archive of the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California.7 This material, too,
has largely been ignored until now, because its complex provenance has
obscured the nature of its contents. Therefore the documents seem at  rst sight
to be merely a motley collection of odds and ends. In the following discussion,
accordingly, particular emphasis will be placed on reconstructing the system
of information management that was built up within the DKZ, since an under-
standing of the nature of the DKZ will allow these previously intractable
sources to be made more readily accessible for future research.
The Stanford collection shows that the picture of the raison d’eˆtre of the
DKZ that was painted in 1943 was in no sense merely a protective statement
concocted by a few bureaucrats fearful of being conscripted to the Eastern
Front. During the war the DKZ had assumed the roˆle of a webmaster of inter-
national networks; it controlled international organizations based in Europe,
using the most up-to-date information technology; and it expanded its holdings
of documentation by plundering international organizations in occupied terri-
tories. With its transformation from a documentation centre to an international
organization with diplomatic privileges, however, the DKZ came up against
the resistance of the authorities, with consequences that were fatal to its roˆle.
2 CHIDK, 1363/1/166: German Central Conference Of ce to Reich Ministry for Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda, Berlin, 19.1.1943.
3 Even in German administrative history it attracts only brief mention, as an agency subordinate
to the propaganda division of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda.
Cf. Willi A. Boelcke, ‘§14, Volksaufkla¨rung und Propaganda’, in Kurt G. A. Jeserich et al.
(eds.), Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte , vol. 4 (Stuttgart, 1985), p. 955.
4 The German Federal Archives, however, mainly hold personnel and budgetary documents,
auditors’ reports and annual reports. Cf. Wolfram Werner, Bestand R 55, Reichsministerium fu¨r
Volksaufkla¨ rung und Propaganda, Findbu¨cher zu Besta¨nden des Bundesarchivs , vol. 15
(Koblenz, 1979).
5 National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter NA), Micro lmed Captured German
Documents: Records of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda
(Reichsministerium fu¨r Volksaufkla¨rung und Propaganda, hereafter RMVP) T-70, roll 106; T-
580, roll 605,  le 193.
6 CHIDK, 1363/1/54, 1363/1/166.
7 Hoover Institution Archives, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA (hereafter
HIA), Germany, DKZ.
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The curbing of the DKZ forced the leadership of the Third Reich to adopt a
very broad de nition of foreign policy that now encompassed the international
conferences and organizations that were previously not exclusively diplo-
matic responsibilities.
In the National Socialist semantic context the word ‘international’ (and its
cognates) carried the connotations ‘un-German’, ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘part of the
Jewish world conspiracy’.8 Therefore the existence of the DKZ seems dif cult
to explain and does not  t in the historiography of National Socialism. How-
ever, source material from the DKZ have an explanatory value from several
points of view: Activities of the DKZ illustrate the uses and limits of a
polycratic structure of rule and, in particular, shed light on the debate concern-
ing the respective roˆles of the foreign and propaganda ministries,9 furnishing
material with which to address the thorny question of sources regarding the
latter. In addition, the DKZ managed and in uenced international contacts of
all kinds, although special attention was given to scienti c networks. Therefore
an analysis of these source materials can make a contribution to recent debates
on new approaches in intellectual history.1 0 Finally, investigating the post-war
history of the DKZ  les allows one to re ect on the shift in historians’ research
interests that has followed the ending of the Cold War. The trail that the DKZ’s
 les followed after 1943 was a tortuous one and cannot be reconstructed in its
entirety. Eventually, however, the remains of the DKZ archive were brought
to the USA, speci ed as academic documents. The fact that the documents,
thus neutralized, revealed the workings of a National Socialist administrative
centre, and that they consisted in part of plundered  les, was largely lost to
view. The dearth of interest in the way in which the National Socialists had
instrumentalized international co-operation coincided with the establishment of
the post-war international system. In this context, with the growth of the family
of the United Nations, international organizations were playing an increasing
roˆle. These—the UN’s specialized agencies, at any rate—were being kept more
or less successfully at arms’ length from the turmoil of the Cold War.1 1 With
8 Cornelia Schmitz-Berning, Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus (Berlin and New York,
1998), pp. 322ff.
9 On this, cf. Peter Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg. Die Presseabteilung des Auswa¨rtigen
Amtes unter Ribbentrop (Munich, 1987).
10 On this, cf. Lutz Raphael, ‘Radikales Ordnungsdenken und die Organisation totalita¨rer
Herrschaft: Weltanschauungseliten und Humanwissenschaftler im NS-Regime’, Geschichte und
Gesellschaft , 27, 1 (2001), pp. 5–40; Michael Fahlbusch, Wissenschaft im Dienst der national-
sozialistischen Politik? (Baden-Baden, 1999); Doris Kaufmann (ed.), Geschichte der Kaiser-
Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus. Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven der
Forschung , 2 vols. (Go¨ttingen, 2000).
11 Within this climate, the former head of the DKZ, Karl Schweig, enjoyed a notable post-
war career in the Tourist Of ce of Du¨sseldorf (see his autobiography: Karl Franz Schweig,
Du¨sseldorf ist mehr als eine Reise wert. Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse eines Verkehrsdirektors
(Du¨sseldorf, 1968)). He also published a book on conference organization, later published in
the United States (K. F. Schweig, Wie organisiere ich einen Kongress? (Du¨sseldorf, 1957); K.
F. Schweig, The Organization of an International Congress , trans. Jules Cortell and Henry Marx
(New York, 1966)). Schweig had previously cited a work with the same title under the heading
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the ending of the Cold War, and with globalization and the effort to come to
terms with the past, new alignments of interest and a shift in historiographical
activity are likely to occur. The DKZ documents show the extent, little appreci-
ated hitherto, to which the archives of international organizations were plun-
dered, in icting a signi cant loss of collective memory during the Second
World War.1 2 At the same time the National Socialists’ instrumentalization of
international organizations possessing differing degrees of of cial status serves
as a reminder of how indispensable multilateral and transnational co-operation
have become in an increasingly interlinked world.
The history of the DKZ explains how vulnerable these networks are and
draws attention to the dark side of globalization. In addition, the case of the
DKZ provides an opportunity to view globalization as a historical process and
to think about the process systematically in terms of a speci c case. Although
the literature on globalization now testi es to a growing interest in the period
before 1945,1 3 there is a shortage of systematic historiographical surveys and
of convincing case-studies. Transnational networks do not  t easily with an
event-orientated conception of foreign policy and call for an expansion of the
traditional cast-list of foreign-policy actors. Networks can rarely be fully mas-
tered, since thematic variety is one of their essential features. They do not tie
in closely either with the evolution of institutions or with relations between
persons; they neither are the product of an evolutionary process of moderniz-
ation nor can they be assigned to a pragmatic conception of politics. Yet since
the fundamental objective of the German Central Conference Of ce was to
compile as complete and world-wide an inventory of networks as possible, the
case of the DKZ sheds light on the methodological problems associated with
such an objective and makes possible an analysis of networks speci cally in
terms of their roˆle as providers of information—whereby the term ‘network’
stresses precisely this communicative aspect. That said, it should be emphasized
that focusing on ‘information’ as a notion to be added to the repertoire of basic
historical concepts1 4 is not so much a matter of discourse as of directing atten-
tion to the assimilation of large bodies of data—basically a process governed
by technology—and to the logistics of information management. Accordingly,
the present study will begin with a reconstruction of the sources, since these
‘Literary activity’ in the CV he prepared for the SS in 1940. Cf. NA, Roll List for SS Of cers,
Personnel Files, micro lm publication, A3343 series SSO, roll 124B: Curriculum Vitae, Berlin,
10 June 1940, [signed] Karl Schweig.
12 For the debate on this, cf. The Return of the Looted Collections (1946–1996): An Un nished
Chapter (Proceedings of an International Symposium to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Return
of Dutch Book Collections from Germany in 1946, Amsterdam, 15–16 April 1996), Amster-
dam, 1997.
13 Cf. James Foreman-Peck (ed.), Historical Foundations of Globalization (Cheltenham, 1998);
Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century
(Oxford and New York, 1997); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial
Change: Global Governance since 1850 (Oxford and Cambridge, 1994).
14 ‘Information’ appears in a list of desiderata in the concluding volume of O. Brunner, W.
Conze, R. Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe , vol. 7 (Stuttgart, 1992), p. vii.
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re ect the DKZ’s conception of information. This was primarily a matter of
building up different card-index systems and archives.
I: Networks and Information Management: the DKZ Archive
When the of cial from the propaganda ministry who had been deputed to
review the DKZ criticized the ‘excessive quantity of typewriters and of ce
furniture’ and recommended a reduction in personnel,1 5 the heads of the DKZ
drew up an extended memorandum in the department’s defence. They argued
that its lavish equipment represented a share in the spoils of war1 6 and provided
a detailed list of personnel and their duties. From this memorandum it emerges,
in particular, that the Central Conference Of ce in Berlin employed senior
female clerks with foreign-language skills who handled and processed infor-
mation using highly modern methods, notably punched cards. Each of the prin-
cipal divisions of the DKZ—the internal division, the external division, the
currency division and the archive and library—had access to card-index sys-
tems with cross-referenced search facilities. The internal division administered
the standardized authorization forms needed for the holding of meetings and
conferences within Germany and also operated a card index of interpreters.
The latter comprised some 350 closed and seventy current personal dossiers
and gave a full and detailed picture of every individual who possessed an
interpreter’s permit during the time of the Third Reich.1 7 The currency division
ran what it called a currency card index, which by 1943 contained in excess
of 50,000 cards; in addition, 35,000 individual  les were held in a specially
devised currency registry. The currency card index, which went back to the
1930s, was the oldest information system within the DKZ and contained the
‘raw material for building up the archive’s personal card index’.1 8 The currency
applications collected here were recorded on large-format index cards stating
the amount of currency authorized together with notes concerning the pro-
cessing of the application and information on the applicant, including address,
15 The recommendation was that the DKZ should make do with a staff of twelve instead of
twenty-four. CHIDK, 1363/1/166: Haegert (Head, Section S), Memorandum, Berlin, 1.2.1943.
16 For example, ‘a number of items of furniture . . . were procured at that time from the occu-
pied territories ’. CHIDK, 1363/1/166: German Central Conference Of ce to Reich Ministry for
Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, Berlin, 4.2.1943.
17 HIA, Germany, DKZ, Personnel File, vols. 350–7. The colour of the index card indicated
each person’s form of employment: green for interpreters used as personal escorts, blue for those
translating in meetings, yellow for those who were present in negotiations, pink for microphone
interpreters, orange for conference interpreters and white for translators. This section of the
records covers no fewer than 418 people and its contents are thus identical with the particulars
for 1943 drawn up by the DKZ (CHIDK, 1363/1/166: Personnel of German Central Conference
Of ce, no place or date of compilation given, initialled R[ichter], 1943). Parts of the personal
dossiers consist of personal data and information on Party membership; other parts contain CVs,
references and assessments of the political reliability and professional aptitude of the individual
in question.
18 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 316: German Central Conference Of ce (DKZ), Annual Report,
1936, Con dential, p. 5.
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travel destination and length and purpose of stay. Occasionally a ‘Halt’ (‘Stop’)
stamp is found, with the cancellation procedure permitting the annotations
‘Deceased’, ‘Address expired’, ‘Loser’ or ‘Jew’.1 9 The scope and retrievability
of the information obtained via the currency-control system were far more
important than the administrative procedure itself. The DKZ was able to use
the control system to gather data about non-of cial as well as of cial German
participants in international conferences and congresses. The DKZ however
was entitled only to make preliminary checks; the actual decision-making auth-
ority rested with the Reich Currency Control Of ce in the Reich Economics
Ministry. Institution-based dossiers in the archive and library of the DKZ com-
plemented this personal card index. As early as 1936 the DKZ reported that it
had opened dossiers on 1,500 international and 2,000 German associations.2 0
The information recorded in them could be accessed either by reference to the
name of the organization or via a subject index in which international organiza-
tions were classi ed in terms of ten topics.2 1 In a report compiled in 1943
Luise Lindskog, the DKZ senior clerk in charge of this work, emphasized that
the ‘Central Conference Of ce Archive of International Organizations’ was
‘still in its infancy’.2 2 Indeed, it was not until the outbreak of war that the
folders of the archive had really begun to  ll. At that time the DKZ accumu-
lated information that had been either captured, imparted under pressure or
entrusted to DKZ specialists working under false colours. These dossiers con-
tained plundered original  les of international organizations, unsigned tran-
scripts of interrogations of representatives of international organizations in the
occupied territories, and reports from non-occupied countries drawn up by DKZ
spies specially assigned to investigate international organizations.
A large part of the captured material, which also included books and pam-
phlets, came from the archive and library of the Union of International Associ-
ations (UIA), whose headquarters were in Brussels. The UIA, founded before
the First World War,2 3 contained, according to National Socialist estimates, the
largest contemporary archive, and the most important library, on international
organizations. After Brussels was occupied, the head of the DKZ took pro-
19 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 410: Personnel Dossier for Currency Applications: DKZ Form,
Currency Applications Card Index, Draft Work Plan, I 3/3 0537.
20 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 316: German Central Conference Of ce (DKZ), Annual Report,
1936, Con dential.
21 These were State, Press, Law, Education, Public Welfare, Science, Medicine, Trade and
Industry, Agriculture, and Transport. Cf. HIA, Germany, DKZ, vols. 375 and 376.
22 CHIDK, 1363/1/166: Report without address or addressee, sent (according to accompanying
letter) to the head of the DKZ Richter, [signed] Luise Lindskog, Berlin, 25 October 1943.
23 The UIA continues to publish a Yearbook of International Organisations . On the founding
of the UIA, cf. Georges Patrick Speeckaert, Le Premier Sie`cle de la coope´ration internationale
1815–1914 (Brussels, 1980). The function and signi cance of the UIA with regard to National
Socialist internationalism have not been the subject of previous discussion, owing to the UIA’s
de facto non-existence during the war. Cf. G. P. Speeckaert, ‘Regards sur soixante anne´es
d’activite´ de l’Union des Associations Internationales ’, in Synthe`ses, Revue internationale , 288
(1970), p. 29.
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visional charge of the UIA’s administration and arranged for several large con-
signments of books and  les to be transported to Berlin. It was only after these
Belgian captures had been made that the DKZ assumed an international as well
as a national dimension, as it now also sought to inherit the functions of the
UIA. This form of information-gathering entailed some logistic measures.
Wide-ranging support from the Wehrmacht, the Gestapo and the Sicherheits-
dienst was needed, as the scale of the plundering and the quantities of material
that were transported to Berlin between 1940 and 1942 were considerable.
According to internal ministry data from the year 1941, ‘over 50 tonnes of  le
and book materials on international associations and conferences’ had been
taken from Paris and Brussels to Berlin. The same report stated that ‘a further
5,000–10,000 conference reports and books as well as valuable  le materials’
were ‘on the way to Berlin’.2 4 Assessing these captured materials, however,
was a very time-consuming business. Therefore when the bombing of Berlin
began, parts of the DKZ archive had to be taken to a place of safety before
the Central Conference Of ce was able to evaluate the Belgian captures prop-
erly. The  les of the propaganda ministry now in Moscow indicate that a sub-
stantial part of the archive, the entire interpreters’ card index and probably also
the bulk of the currency card index had been secured in bunkers by the summer
of 1943. What happened to the rest of the archive, to those captured Belgian
 les that had not yet been integrated into the DKZ dossiers and to the DKZ’s
library, which also contained plundered materials, is a matter for speculation.
In October the budget division of the propaganda ministry offered to house all
remaining materials ‘in our bunkers in Starpel’,2 5 in the ‘Fortress Front Oder-
Warthe Arc’ which had been developed rapidly during 1943. Whether this
actually occurred is not clear, even in light of those materials that have been
made available by the Russian central archive.
After late October 1943 traces of the DKZ disappear, until references to it
are made in American sources at the end of the war. Major Leo Alexander, a
member of one of the special Allied units designated to search for  les, came
across two DKZ documents while going through the records of the German
Research Institute for Psychiatry (the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut in Munich) and
wrote a report on them.2 6 The meagre contents of these documents—on con-
formist behaviour by German participants at international conferences—left the
24 NA, Micro lmed Captured German Documents, RMVP, T-580, roll 605,  le 193 (2nd part):
Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Kongresszentrale, Haushaltpla¨ne 1937–1944, Jahresberichte 1937–
1941 (hereafter NA, Jahresberichte): Letter from Director II to Minister, Berlin, 22.2.1941.
25 CHIDK, 1363/1/166: Head of Budget, Memorandum on Position Paper of Budget Division,
Berlin, 27.10.1943.
26 Library of Congress, Washington, DC, PB 1784: ‘Methods for In uencing International
Scienti c Meetings as Laid Down by German Scienti c Organizations ’, Report by Major Leo
Alexander MC, USA CIOS [Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee], item 24
Medical.
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American author somewhat helpless.2 7 At this stage, clearly, no link was made
with a larger DKZ collection that was also in Allied hands. References to larger
amounts of material are not found until 1947, when the Library of Congress
despatched a ‘European Mission’. This was a group of librarians among whom
the Hoover Institution was also represented, and it was to the Hoover Institution
that the  les of the DKZ were  nally consigned after being released by the
Allied military administration for transportation to the USA in the same year.2 8
The transportation of the  les was accompanied by an ‘Order # 4’, ‘which
speci cally denies access to these materials to any future German govern-
ment’.2 9 There was no mention of any need to reveal the nature of National
Socialist policy towards international organizations or to discuss the plundering
of those organizations’ archives and the threats that were made to their presi-
dents and general secretaries. The Central Conference Of ce materials that
were taken to the United States were not declared as partly stolen property—
any more than they had been by the founders of the DKZ themselves. They
were simply classi ed as documents to be used for research purposes. The
 nding aid that was eventually produced in the 1970s conveys the impression
of a jumbled assortment of odds and ends and does not make plain either the
systematic nature of the original material or the conception of information that
the DKZ had developed. It is understandable, therefore, that the collection lab-
elled ‘Germany, DKZ’ has rarely been consulted until the present time.
II: 1934–7: From Promotional Agency to the ‘Olympics of
the Spirit’
In August 1934 the propaganda ministry informed a group of other ministries
about its plans to establish an academic and scienti c Central Conference
Of ce.3 0 The ministry proceeded discreetly, however, and assigned the job of
setting up the new institution to the eminent Berlin Medical Society. This
association was told, when funds were allocated to it, that the link between
27 The American report concentrated on assessing the contents of the two papers and did not
discuss the DKZ as such. Alexander regarded the reported attempts to ensure conformist behav-
iour on the part of conference delegates as ‘clumsy’; other proposals, however, he described as
‘dangerously clever’ (ibid.).
28 On this operation, cf. Library of Congress, LC Archives, European Mission, vol. 17: John
W. Cronin, LC to Nina Almond, Librarian, the Hoover Institution and Library on War, Revol-
ution and Peace, Washington, DC, 7.8.1947.
29 In this connection, I should like to thank Agnes F. Peterson, curator emerita, of the Hoover
Institution Archives in Stanford, CA and Dr Elena S. Danielson, Archivist, the Hoover Institution
Archives, for the support they have provided during the course of this research. The  ndings
reported here are based on information passed on by Dr Danielson after conducting her own re-
searches.
30 Deutsches Bundesarchiv, R 55, vol. 743: Memorandum of Meeting on International Confer-
ences held at Reich Ministry of the Interior on 8.8.1934, copy (extracts) of a copy, Berlin,
13.8.1934. This meeting was attended by representatives of the interior ministry, the Foreign
Of ce, the Reich Health Of ce, the Reich Public Health Service Committee and the Prussian
interior ministry, as well of the propaganda ministry.
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the Central Conference Of ce and the propaganda ministry had to be kept
con dential.3 1 The institution, at this stage named the ‘Scienti c Central Con-
ference Of ce’, was headed by Dr Alfred Knapp, known as the author of a
paper calling for the creation of a national promotional agency for international
academic and scienti c co-operation.3 2 In January 1935, in a circular letter, the
Scienti c Central Conference Of ce revealed its existence to scienti c societies
in Germany for the  rst time,3 3 and by December 1935 the new of ce was
suf ciently well established to be presented to the supreme Reich authorities.3 4
It was on this occasion that the propaganda ministry announced that the insti-
tution would henceforward be known, not as the Scienti c, but as the German,
Central Conference Of ce.3 5 At this stage the DKZ provided services in arrang-
ing international conferences in Germany. In 1935 Knapp proposed to establish
the compilation of personal-based cross-reference systems and the production
of lea ets prescribing the correct behaviour of German delegates to inter-
national meetings; he also referred to the question of Franco-German relations
at such meetings.3 6 In fact, the DKZ already held a considerable quantity of
documentary material including literature on conference organization, lists of
available conference sites (with meticulous details of their size and infrastruc-
ture, down to the number of telephone booths), even information about suitable
car hire had been accumulated. The DKZ organized translation facilities, held
sheet music and gramophone recordings of national anthems, stored collections
of  ags of different sizes, made suggestions for internal and external decor-
ations, and kept in readiness the draft of a telegram of thanks to the Fu¨hrer.
The Of ce also published a series of lea ets on how to organize conferences,
distributed notes on dress code and on the  ner points of diplomatic protocol,
proposed table seating plans and the sealing of invitation envelopes with
adhesive stamps bearing the conference logo. The DKZ’s remit, however, did
not extend beyond the provision of non-obligatory services, except in the case
31 Deutsches Bundesarchiv, R 55, vol. 743: RMVP to Board of the Berlin Medical Society,
22.11.1934.
32 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 373: Alfred Knapp, ‘A National Promotional Agency is Needed:
Memorandum on the Call for a National Promotional Agency and an Outline of its Tasks’,
Berlin, n.d.
33 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 125: Letter from German Physical Society, Chairman
Kohlschu¨tter to the Scienti c Central Conference Of ce, Potsdam, 7.2.1935.
34 Letter from Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda to Supreme Reich
Authorities, Berlin, 20 December 1935, in NA, RMVP 1936–44, T-70, roll 106, Pro.6506,
3629960f.
35 The title and terms of reference of the new institution derived from the pre-1914 period:
there had been a call for a central conference of ce back in 1908. Cf. ‘Organisation des Kongreß-
wesens’, Volkswirtschaftliche Bla¨tter, 7, 18 (1908), pp. 337f. In 1913 a central conference of ce
was established as part of the Greater Berlin central of ce for tourism. A letter (4.8.1913) from
this former central conference of ce, recording the af liation with the Berlin central of ce, is
among the DKZ documents: HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 360. The Central Conference Of ce of
the 1930s, however, had nothing in common with its predecessor beyond the name.
36 Deutsches Bundesarchiv, R 55, vol. 743: Scienti c Central Conference Of ce, Programme
of Work, 8.1.1935.
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of currency control. Even this instrument of control had its limits and Knapp
criticized the facilitation of tourist travel through bilateral agreements. He
insisted that such agreements should apply only to holidays, not to conferences
and study trips.3 7 Moreover, Knapp’s complaints indicate that currency control
encompassed only conference trips by individuals, not visits abroad by del-
egates of the state or the Party. Nevertheless, currency control and docu-
mentation did give the DKZ some scope for action within Germany. Its aim,
however, of attracting to Germany as many international conferences as poss-
ible was still a long way from ful lment, and in any case was hedged around
with reservations. In 1935 the London-based Medical Research Council said
that it would agree to the holding of the next international physiology confer-
ence in Germany only under certain conditions: thus the state had to guarantee
non-intervention and to accord legal rights to non-Aryan participants. In a pos-
ition paper submitted by the DKZ3 8 the required concessions were granted,
though they were not formulated as state guarantees. Henceforward the DKZ
instructed German conference participants and organizers to display ideologi-
cal restraint:
For the duration of the conference it must be immaterial to us whether these people are
democrats, or Marxists, or even Jews. It is the Fu¨hrer’s personal decision that even Jews
who come as foreigners to the international conferences held in Germany should be
treated with the international politeness naturally due to foreigners and should be
regarded as such provided they do not offend against German hospitality.39
Outspoken opinions and vigorous language were inappropriate at international
conferences, according to the DKZ, and awkward questions that were likely
to arise should be tactfully circumvented.4 0
During 1936–7 the standing of the DKZ began to strengthen markedly. A
decree of the Fu¨hrer issued in November 1936 laid down that all international
meetings and conferences taking place in Germany had to obtain permission
from the DKZ.4 1 The of ce was now able to style itself of cially as an execu-
tive organ of the Reich propaganda ministry designated by decree of the Fu¨hrer.
The ministry for its part clari ed the status of the DKZ by converting it into an
of cially registered association (eingetragener Verein).4 2 The veil of secrecy,
however, was only partially lifted: the Fu¨hrer’s oft-quoted decree was not
allowed to be published in its entirety, although parts of it were cited on every
37 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 373, The History of International Associations [folder 2]: DKZ,
Dr Knapp to RMVP, Berlin, 30.7.1935.
38 Ibid., 3.8.1935.
39 Ibid., Paper by General Secretary Schweig on the Occasion of the General Assembly of the
RDKP on Saturday 22.4.1939 in Baden, Con dential.
40 Ibid.
41 NA, RMVP 1936–44, T-70, roll 106, Pro.6506, 3629383f: Decree of the Fu¨hrer, 13.11.1936.
42 The chairman of the association was appointed by the propaganda minister and in turn
appointed the chief executive. NA, RMVP 1936–44, T-70, roll 106, Pro. 6506, 3629837: Direc-
tive (copy) of RMVP, [signed] Dr Goebbels, Berlin, 29.1.1937.
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application form for permission to hold an international conference.4 3 With its
new status, and with its clearly enhanced scope for domestic activity, the DKZ
now began to extend its international connections as well. In 1937, the World
Fair in Paris provided almost ideal conditions for this undertaking. Previous
World Fairs had usually been accompanied by a large number of international
gatherings of widely differing kinds. However, the French organizers used
international gatherings as an element in Franco-German competition,
presenting them as ‘Olympics of the Spirit’. Therefore the Paris Exposition
was to be a riposte to the Berlin Olympic Games of 1936. The DKZ accordingly
demanded that German participation should be organized on as wide a scale
as possible, on political grounds.4 4 The issue of Franco-German competition
convinced the of ce of the Deputy to the Fu¨hrer. This of ce decided that the
DKZ should send a representative to Paris4 5 and called an inter-ministerial
meeting on the question of international conferences. This meeting was
attended by prominent  gures in the Party and the government, with the upshot
that the DKZ’s activities now received of cial recognition. Subsequently its
personnel and budget were substantially expanded. 4 6 The DKZ’s success also
roused the Foreign Of ce out of its previous indifference: it protested, in vain,
against the DKZ’s presence in Paris, and then began to give special attention
to, and to impede, the activities of the DKZ.4 7
43 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 192: Letter from Schweig to Forschungsdienst Reichsarbeitsge-
meinschaften der Landbauwissenschaft, [Berlin], 18.8.1938. The DKZ stated that it was not
authorized to send the decree of the Fu¨hrer and Reich Chancellor for inspection.
44 Knapp emphasized that ‘this accumulation of conferences in the French capital is politically
signi cant’ and should be regarded as a ‘counter-measure to Germany’s work’. NA, Jahresbe-
richte: Internal letter from DKZ to Divisional Head I C, Berlin, 6.3.1937.
45 The DKZ representative was to be authorized both to ‘make regular reports and to ask for
scientists by telegraph’: NA, Jahresberichte: Letter (copy) from NSDAP, Deputy to the Fu¨hrer,
[signed on behalf of] M. Bormann, to RMVP, Berlin/Munich, 26.3.1937.
46 An extra member of staff was to deal with the currency applications restricted to of cial
delegations. A special fund of ‘approx. 2.5 million Reichsmark’ was added to the total 5.5
million Reichsmark approved for purposes other than the World Fair conferences; such appli-
cations had soared to 20,000 in number in the course of the year, while an additional 24,600
applications came from German participants in the Paris conferences. Cf. HIA, Germany, DKZ,
vol. 156: Review: Areas of Activity of the German Central Conference Of ce; Cultural Policy
Tasks; Conferences Abroad; The Paris Conferences of the 1937 International Exposition; New
Recruitment; The Archive; The Card Index; Summary; Literature, 21.2.1938, Blu/Bl. The  nance
ministry established a special budget allowing scientist delegates to be sent to the Paris confer-
ences, with the costs not being transferable elsewhere. This budget was also to be used to develop
opportunities for younger researchers.
47 NA, Jahresberichte: Minutes of a Meeting on International Conferences, Attended by Staff
of the Deputy to the Fu¨hrer, Reich Ministry of the Interior, Ribbentrop of ce, Reich Chamber
of Physicians, Reich Currency Central Of ce, Reich Finance Ministry, Foreign Of ce, Foreign
Department of the NSDAP, Reich Education Ministry, Propaganda Ministry (divisions I, II, VII
and DKZ), Berlin, 8.4.1937.
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III: Domestic Consolidation and Wartime Advance (1938–41)
It is dif cult to say how the growing tension in relations between the DKZ
and the Foreign Of ce interfered with internal power struggle. However, both
of them in uenced changes in the DKZ after the closing of the Paris exhibition.
In the summer of 1938 Karl F. Schweig, who had entered the currency division
in 1935, became head of the DKZ; he immediately accused his defeated rival
Alfred Knapp (who had now resigned from the DKZ) of responsibility for
the problems with the foreign ministry.4 8 In Karl Schweig a power-conscious
technocrat had taken over the DKZ. According to his personal SS  le he had
served in the SA, joined the party in 1937 and thereafter worked voluntarily
for the Sicherheitsdienst. These activities were to lead to promotion to the rank
of SS-Obersturmfu¨hrer.4 9
Under Schweig’s leadership the DKZ underwent a change of direction.
Knapp had tried to copy the League of Nations by establishing a National
Socialist organization comparable to the League’s International Institute of
Intellectual Co-operation. Schweig, on the contrary, placed the stress on organi-
zation, the strengthening of executive powers through collaboration with the
SS, and the mobilizing power of collective demonization. Since 1935 the DKZ
had exercised ideological restraint, on purely pragmatic grounds. After Schweig
took over, the antisemitic pro le of the organization became more clearly
marked. On 1 September 1938 the DKZ and the Institute for the Study of the
Jewish Question made a formal arrangement to exchange information. In return
for receiving literature and foreign newspaper articles dealing with conference
matters, the DKZ provided the Institute both with literature and with ‘carbon
copies of personal  les on foreign personalities known to the DKZ to be anti-
semites, together with details of their political attitude towards Germany; also
extracts from conference reports in so far as these refer to attendance by foreign
Jews or German emigrants’.5 0 As part of this new approach, attempts were also
made to use the growing body of personal data to defame foreign personalities.
With a view to in ltrating the International Union against Cancer, the DKZ
decided to launch an international campaign to deprive the Swiss Leandro
48 Schweig claimed that Knapp had sold DKZ  les to the Culture Section of the Foreign Of ce
and prompted the Foreign Of ce’s demand for interministerial control of the DKZ. Cf. HIA,
Germany, DKZ, vol. 317: Note for Oberregierungsrat Imhoff.
49 ‘Schweig is head of the German Central Conference Of ce and has been working for the
SD for a considerable time in an honorary capacity. By dint of both his position and his personal
connections he has already performed valuable services for Of ce VI . . .’: NA, Roll List for
SS Of cers, Personnel Files, micro lm publication, 3343 series SSO, roll 124B: Recommen-
dation Record of the Fu¨hrer Corps, 19.6.1940.
50 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 165: Letter from Walter Blume (DKZ) to Hansgeorg Trurnit,
Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question, [Berlin], 1.9.1938.
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Tomarkin5 1 of the post of General Secretary to which he had been proposed.
Safeguarded by its agreement with the propaganda ministry,5 2 the DKZ asked
the leaders of German conference delegations to write to foreign colleagues
on the matter,5 3 in order to prepare ‘the climate for the intended establishment
of a new international cancer organization’.5 4 To retain control over the action,
the DKZ enclosed return-addressed postcards on which those contacted were
to con rm that they had written the appropriate letters. The campaign cost a
man who was himself an ambiguous internationalist his job.5 5
The enhanced co-operation with the apparatus of repression of the Third
Reich that marked the Schweig era—with the Central Conference Of ce plac-
ing its information-gathering facilities at the service of regulation, suppression
and espionage—widened the scope of the DKZ’s in uence. The of ce, how-
ever, continued to rely on voluntary collaborators. The academics and scientists
it used as informants, who belonged to international networks in their pro-
fessional capacity, proved to be more than a little zealous for detail. The case
of Prof. Dr Baader, head of the University Institute for Occupational Diseases
in Berlin, may serve as an example. Baader had learned from a professional
colleague in New York that a number of MPs in London had formed an
Imperial Policy Group, and he sent the relevant New York letter to the DKZ.5 6
The DKZ in turn consulted the Gestapo, which classi ed the British group as
a ‘front organization of the Home Of ce’.5 7
In 1938 the DKZ had a staff of thirty-four, occupied three  oors of a building
on Ludendorffstraße in Berlin and had more resources at its disposal than in
1937, in the year of the Paris exhibition. Nevertheless, during 1938–9 the of ce
found itself faced with mounting obstacles. The idea of controlled co-operation
and the drive to cover all international organizations and conferences collided
with the expansion of the Third Reich. The incorporation of Bohemia and
Moravia, Danzig and Austria posed issues that led to problems of domestic
co-ordination, exacerbated the latent turf war between the ministries and jeop-
ardized the appearance of unity that German delegations were meant to display
when abroad. The DKZ issued regulations governing the behaviour of Protec-
51 On Tomarkin, cf. Franziska Rogger, ‘Das ju¨dische Universita¨ tsleben in Bern zwischen
Sozialismus und Zionismus, Antisemitismus und Nationalsozialismus ’, in Georg Eisner and Ru-
pert Moser (eds.), Reiz und Fremde ju¨discher Kultur (Berner Kulturhistorische Vorlesungen,
Bern, 2000), pp. 153f.
52 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 316: Note, Berlin, 21.11.1938, Dr. Tho/Br./Hz.
53 On this occasion the DKZ ignored its own injunction against antisemitic statements. It was
to be pointed out to foreign scientists ‘how a criminal Jew is capable of destroying good inter-
national relationships and commercially exploiting purely scienti c work’: HIA, Germany, DKZ,
vol. 316: circular of DKZ, corrected draft, n.d.
54 Ibid.
55 Tomarkin had been investigated by the Swiss authorities after the First World War as a
possible Bolshevist; in Rome in 1934 he brie y paraded as a Fascist. Rogger, ‘Das ju¨dische
Universita¨ tsleben’.
56 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 247: Prof. Dr Baader to DKZ, Berlin, 5.6.1939.
57 Ibid., DKZ index card.
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torate and Czech delegations,5 8 but was unable, for example, to prevent Bohem-
ian and Moravian delegates to the plenary meeting of the International Com-
mission on Illumination from steadfastly refusing to be classed as members of
the German delegation.5 9 Equally, the German authorities themselves caused
dif culties, after the Austrian Anschluß, by seeking to transform international
organizations with their headquarters in Vienna into German associations.
Moves of this sort restricted the DKZ’s international in uence, since it was
essential that such organizations should remain as international bodies if they
were to be successfully in ltrated and instrumentalized. The DKZ accordingly
supported the protests by the organizations that were threatened with nationaliz-
ation and opened a branch of ce in Vienna.6 0 Subsequent reports, however,
indicated that the Vienna of ce was unable to achieve very much:
The International Union of Artistes was of course absorbed into the Reich Chamber of
Theatre immediately after the upheaval (Umbruch), so far as Reich German members
were concerned. Similarly, the International Music Of ce disappeared after the change,
since many of the activities of this of ce are now performed by the Reich Chamber of
Music. The international character of this association was in great measure represented
by Jews. This was particularly blatant in the case of the International Association of
Advocates, the International Timber Committee and the Department for Timber Utiliz-
ation. Naturally, after 1938 the Pan-European Union under its President Count Couden-
hove-Kalergi was politically quite intolerable.61
The International Hotelmen’s Association and the International Association of
Stockbrokers were also dissolved and integrated into German associations.
Other bodies, however, put up successful resistance, with DKZ support. The
president of the International Association of Colour Chemists, Prof. Dr Ing.
Otto Mecheels, protested with the simple proposition: ‘An international associ-
ation cannot be made subordinate to a German economic body.’6 2 In January
1939 Mecheels expressed his thanks to the DKZ and informed it of the release
58 Ibid., vol. 121: Letter from DKZ/Blu to President Karl Vetter, [Berlin], 4.7.1939.
59 Two further months elapsed before the German Lighting Technology Society reported to
the DKZ that the Czech committee had been dissolved. Cf. Ibid., vol. 37: Letter from German
Lighting Technology Society (Registered Association), in National Socialist Federation of Ger-
man Technology, Foreign Department, to German Central Conference Of ce, Berlin, 27.9.1939:
‘Further to our letter of 25.7.39, we are now able to inform you that the former Czech committee
of the International Commission on Illumination, which in May, contrary to the instructions of
the Reich Ministry of the Interior and of the Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, had not
dissolved but merely re-named itself the “Lighting Committee for Bohemia and Moravia”, has
now been dissolved in accordance with a decision taken at a general meeting of 20.9.39. There
is now no obstacle in the way of incorporating the former Czech committee into German activity
at the International Commission on Illumination, and work on this will begin in the course of
the coming weeks.’
60 The DKZ was given 5,000 Reichsmark to establish this of ce. Cf. NA, Jahresberichte: Letter
from DKZ/Schae to RMVP, [Berlin], 20.3.1939.
61 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 362: Letter from Conference Advisory Service in Reich Propa-
ganda Of ce, Vienna (Schee) to German Central Conference Of ce, Vienna, 16.2.1942.
62 HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 55: Prof. Dr Ing. Otto Mecheels, (1) to Stillhalte-Amt fu¨r Vereine,
(2) to Reichsverwaltung des NSBDT, Mo¨nchen-Gladbach, 23.1.1939.
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of the association’s foreign accounts.6 3 In fact, the local administration was
prepared to release the international association only after payment of a sub-
stantial cash sum, so that further intervention by the propaganda ministry
proved necessary.6 4
These problems may seem to suggest that the outbreak of war would have
brought the demise of the DKZ. The opposite, however, was the case. During—
and because of—the war the DKZ actually extended its scope for international
in uence, and was able to turn these gains to domestic political account.
Schweig, who carried out an impressive programme of travel during the war,6 5
formed contacts in Switzerland as early as the spring of 1940 and was in Zurich
when a Swiss Central Conference Of ce was established on 16 April.6 6 With
the advances of German troops, though, the DKZ’s interest in this branch oper-
ation on neutral territory waned. Instead, the DKZ gained new sources of infor-
mation each time the of ce of an international organization came within the
reach of the Wehrmacht; and with the acquisition of each new dossier, its
domestic political importance increased. The of ce worked closely with the
Wehrmacht, the Gestapo and the SS in this process. Armed with a military
pass stating that he was attached to the Reich Security Central Of ce,6 7 Karl
Schweig personally directed ‘special actions’ against international organiza-
tions in occupied territories in the summer of 1940.6 8 In Paris, on a single day,
30 July 1940, Schweig and his colleagues visited three organizations. He seized
the correspondence of the International Association of Criminal Law, disco-
vered that the International Commission for Air Navigation had already been
closed by the German occupying forces and went on to seal the of ces of the
International Geographical Union, so as to be able to examine its archives
63 Ibid.: Prof. Dr Ing. Otto Mecheels to DKZ/Herr Blume, Mo¨nchen-Gladbach, 28.1.1939.
64 According to the propaganda ministry, the colour chemists, as an international organization,
ought not to be made subordinate to the Stillhaltekommissar fu¨r Vereine, because the relevant
legislation applied only to national associations. It would not be right, the ministry argued, for
a situation to arise, through the replacement of Mecheels by a Swiss, whereby ‘a Swiss president
would have to order payment out of international assets to a German authority’ (Ibid.: RMVP
to Reich Commissioner for the Reuni cation of Austria with the German Reich, Berlin,
21.10.1939, copy for information to DKZ).
65 In the spring of 1941 the head of the DKZ made trips (declared as secret) to Brussels and
Paris; during 1942 he was in Madrid and Lisbon in May, in Stockholm in June, in Munich in
August and in Frankfurt and Vienna in September; and in April 1943 he returned to Lisbon.
Cf. NA, Micro lmed Captured German Documents, RMVP, T-580, roll 636,  le 333 (2nd part):
Propaganda Ministry (H 1171–65/1.4.43), Note, [signed] I.A., Berlin, 1.4.1943.
66 On this, cf. M. Herren and S. Zala, Netzwerk Außenpolitik (forthcoming). In the course of
the war conference of ces were also opened in Belgium, Norway and Romania: HIA, Germany,
DKZ, vol. 276: Letter from DKZ/Schweig to Dr A. Ith, 20.1.1943.
67 CHIDK, 1363/1/166: Military Recruiting Of ce Charlottenburg, Military Pass Notice for
Herr Karl Schweig, 10.5.1940.
68 Cf. HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 125: Daily Report: Special Action against International
Associations, Carried out between 25 July and 12 August 1940 under the Leadership of the
Head of the German Central Conference Of ce, Berlin. The report, classi ed ‘Secret’, explained
that the group consisted of, in addition to Schweig, a Kriminalsekreta¨ r, a lance-corporal of the
Secret Military Police and a driver.
82 Madeleine Herren
undisturbed.6 9 Nor did the materials that were transferred to Berlin come solely
from the archives of international organizations. There was a brisk trade in
booty, as a result of which documents from the archives of the French foreign
ministry and the French embassy in Berlin7 0 also found their way into the
DKZ’s folders.
After the ‘special action’ in Paris Schweig travelled to Brussels and in
August 1940 asked for a lorry and military escort to transport 5 tonnes of
materials to Berlin.7 1 In this instance he concentrated primarily on the UIA,
founded by Paul Otlet, and the libraries and collections connected with Otlet’s
other organizations, which contained an immense quantity of materials on inter-
national bodies: a muse´e illustrating the scope and signi cance of international
networks, and a bibliothe`que mondiale and an international university devoted
to the academic study and promotion of internationalism. A centre inter-
national, founded in 1920, formed the foundation on which further inter-
nationalist schemes were to be developed. All of these institutions were based
in the Palais Mondial, a complex of buildings containing over a hundred rooms
in the Palais du Cinquantenaire in Brussels. When the Germans occupied Brus-
sels these various suites of rooms and the extensive collections in them were
in poor condition. The funding provided by the Carnegie Foundation had been
inadequate, and the Belgian government had suspended its subsidy of the Palais
Mondial even before the outbreak of war. Seeking to preserve his life’s work,
Paul Otlet accordingly consented to let the UIA be placed under the provisional
administration of the executive head of the DKZ. However, at the same time
Otlet continued to negotiate with the Belgian government to try to secure
renewed funding of the Palais Mondial.7 2 The stolen  les show that Otlet
encouraged the Belgian government to use the UIA, keeping in mind that this
organization had, as an umbrella body for international organizations, inter-
national networks at its disposal.7 3 The UAI actually was supposed to survive
the German occupation—but as a cover organization of the DKZ, having sur-
rendered or been robbed of its  les, and headed not by Paul Otlet but by Karl
69 Ibid. Schweig was particularly interested in the Union’s correspondence with the French
General Staff. The materials were handed over to the Military Police. Cf. Mechtild Roessler, ‘La
Ge´ographie aux congre`s internationaux. E´changes scienti ques et con its politiques’, Relations
internationales , 62 (1990), pp. 183–99.
70 These documents included a report on the conferences held in Berlin in 1936: HIA,
Germany, DKZ, vol. 125: French Embassy in Berlin to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Berlin, 10.6.1936.
71 The Gestapo was not actually able to produce a lorry, but with the help of the military
commander in Brussels did provide a sealed railway truck. ‘For conveyance of the important
secret material’, the Gestapo suggested the use of the Brussels–Berlin diplomatic aeroplane: cf.
ibid.: telegram from Secret State Police, State Police Central Station, Du¨sseldorf to Mission
Command in Brussels, with request for forwarding to Herr Karl Schweig, 23.8.1940.
72 Ibid., vol. 373: Union of International Associations: Re´gime during Occupation, 21.8.1940.
73 The text, not dated, is translated into German. The document’s origins are speci ed in the
introduction: ‘The following document was impounded by Security Police at the Union of Inter-
national Associations. It was addressed to the Belgian economics ministry and was written
shortly after the entry of German troops into Brussels’ (ibid., vol. 320).
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Schweig, who made regular appearances at the rue Ducale, the new head-
quarters of the UIA, until 1943. Schweig took over the provisional adminis-
tration of the UIA in November 1940 and reported, with amazement, that ‘every
word written and spoken within the international associations . . . up to 1935’
was available in the archives and library of the UIA.7 4 When the elderly founder
of the UIA raised more and more objections, and refused to co-operate with
the German provisional director, Schweig initiated fundamental changes. He
replaced Paul Otlet and conducted negotiations instead with Prof. C. L. van
Loock, who had been installed as administrator and ‘has assigned to Germany
the new leadership of the Union, which, when the war is over, will be reor-
ganized through the convening of a world conference of the associations’.7 5
The UIA, still international albeit under German control, now had the task of
‘bringing together the international associations, covering all areas of speciali-
zation and knowledge, under the aegis of the Union’. The plan was that conti-
nental European organizations would be centralized  rst, with ‘the non-Euro-
pean countries to follow later’.7 6 The initial step towards realizing this plan
was the systematic exclusion of Paul Otlet. On 27 February 1941 Schweig
asked the SS to search Otlet’s home, alleging that Otlet was a socialist and
freemason, had concealed UIA  les and was responsible for the disappearance
of the UIA’s correspondence with the League of Nations, without which
Schweig claimed not to be able to reorganize the Union.7 7 The SS searched
the  ats of Paul Otlet and his secretaries Colet and Lorphevre and sealed some
rooms so that they could be ‘subjected to a thorough examination’ in Karl
Schweig’s presence.7 8 Schweig con scated books and  les of the UIA, and the
SS seized literature that they considered anti-German, paci st or communist
in tendency.
Belgian resistance within the UIA was thus broken. New threats, however,
arose now from the direction of the German Foreign Of ce. The ministry
sought to prevent the DKZ extending its international in uence by using the
UIA as a Trojan horse. Therefore, the Foreign Of ce called for the dissolution
of the UIA. Schweig countered by arguing that the ‘extension of the DKZ’s
conference work abroad’ was an irresistible and promising process: ‘a camou-
 age of ce of the Reich, working in an important sector, can achieve results
74 Ibid., vol. 317: Report on the Administration of the Union of International Associations in
the Palais Mondial, Brussels, 15.1.1941.
75 Ibid.: Sketch of the Reorganization of the Union of International Associations under German
leadership, Berlin, 28.1.1941, from the Provisional Director of the Union, [signed] Karl Schweig,
and the Administrator of the Union, [signed] Prof. C. L. van Loock.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.: Provisional Director to Representatives of the Chief of the Security Police and the
SD for Belgium and France—Brussels Headquarters, for the attention of SS-Hauptsturmfu¨hrer
Lo¨chelt, Brussels, 27.3.1941.
78 Ibid.: Schweig to Reich Security Central of ce, for the Attention of Obersturmfu¨hrer
Amthor, Berlin, 8.4.1941. The letter cites the report of SS-Hauptsturmfu¨hrer Lo¨chelt that had
been sent to Schweig.
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of a quite different order from those attainable by an of cial policy agency’.7 9
The German use of the UIA remained the subject of vigorous arguments. The
Foreign Of ce criticized Schweig’s report on the provisional administration of
the UIA,8 0 and Schweig made clear who his allies were. He declared that he
was accountable solely to the military administration and to the representative
of the head of the Security Police.8 1 The UIA was not dissolved: indeed, the
occupation authorities took over its considerable expenses.8 2 Attempts to use
the UIA to enhance the DKZ’s international-policy pro le began at once.
Schweig had already set out his thoughts on the reorganization of the UIA in
a secret paper in which he discussed a possible amalgamation of the DKZ and
the UIA. He proposed that a new central agency should be created as a substi-
tute for the League of Nations.8 3 ‘The Central Conference Of ce’, he argued,
‘is not adequate to these demands in its present form. A new central of ce,
with greater powers, a greater range of tasks and greater authority, is required.’
In order that a German ‘monopoly as regards leadership and direction of the
great world associations’ might be achieved, the UIA should be converted into
an international of ce for conferences and associations, with its headquarters
in Berlin. The tasks of the of ce would be to foster the external relations of
German organizations having inter-state and cultural objectives; to hold, and
send delegates to, conferences; to promote the dissemination of German culture
and global awareness of conference  ndings and outcomes; and, over and
beyond the organizational objectives already identi ed by the DKZ, to bring
about nothing less than a ‘new order in international associations and organiza-
tions’.8 4 The author of the paper went so far as to request that the leadership
79 Ibid.: Schweig to RMVP, Berlin, 3.6.1941 (reply to a letter from Foreign Of ce of
13.5.1941).
80 The Foreign Of ce asserted that ‘there can be no question of this institution’s being used
in the reorganization of international associations’: ibid.: Foreign Of ce to RMVP, Berlin,
30.7.1941 (copy).
81 Ibid.: Schw[eig] to RMVP, Berlin, 15.8.1941.
82 In view of the grant of a quarter of a million dollars that the UIA had previously received
from the Carnegie Foundation, the organization’s  nancial needs were set at 291,000
Reichsmark, to be provided out of the propaganda fund: NA, Jahresberichte, Submission to the
Minister, RMVP draft, Berlin, 17.6.1941. In addition, the DKZ asked for a grant of 341,20
Reichsmark for the restructuring of the UIA. As provisional director of the UIA, Karl Schweig
had his own secretary in Brussels and was himself on the UIA payroll, which was  nanced by
the Germans: cf. NA, Jahresberichte: Budget Plan of the Union of International Associations,
Brussels, Berlin, 3.1.1942, [signed] Schweig. (Schweig received a monthly remuneration of 600
Reichsmark.) The personnel listed here comprised the Administrator van Loock, his secretary
Jean Bergmann, a scienti c assistant Marcel Paternostre, the provisional director’s secretary Karl
van de Woestinje, the secretary Andre´e van de Woestinje, a caretaker, a porter, a female janitor
and a chauffeur; two posts were vacant at the time of this budget (NA, Jahresberichte).
83 Cf. HIA, Germany, DKZ, vol. 367: Memorandum on the Reorganization of the Union of
International Associations in Brussels by Karl Schweig, SS-Untersturmfu¨hrer, Deputy Chairman
of the German Central Conference Of ce and Provisional Director of the Union of International
Associations. The paper is in printed form but does not give a date or place of origin; the title
page contains the note, ‘This “Memorandum” is to be treated as a secret document under
§88 . . . This Secret Paper is therefore to be made available only to authorized persons.’
84 Ibid., pp. 26f.
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of the new of ce should be accorded diplomatic privileges and the new insti-
tution granted extraterritoriality.8 5
IV: The Perils of Success and the End of the DKZ (1941–3)
‘In order that the Union’s numerous external relationships should not be sacri-
 ced’,8 6 the UIA under German leadership became a hive of activity. In the
occupied territories it busied itself with compiling inventories of still-existing
international organizations, and reports signed by Schweig’s secretary in Brus-
sels contained the minutes of interrogations of presidents and general sec-
retaries.8 7 An action report of the Paris of ce of the UIA covering the month
of January 1943 gives evidence of how intimately the UIA was involved in
enquiries into, and repression of, international organizations, and how closely
it worked with the DKZ, the military authorities and the Sicherheitsdienst. The
report states that the ‘survey of international associations resident in
France . . . [would appear to be] two-thirds complete’. ‘With regard to matters
of interest to SD-Frankreich that have been ascertained in the course of
enquiries in the area of political associations, the Paris of ce has noti ed SD-
Frankreich of these directly, in the form of reports.’8 8 At the same time as the
UIA became involved in the process of German occupation, its secretariat in
Brussels continued to work as though there were no world war going on. In
the autumn of 1941 the UIA sent out questionnaires for the ostensible purpose
of compiling a directory of international associations in Europe.8 9 The operation
was so well disguised that a large number of international organizations readily
provided information. Few responded like the International Game-Shooting
Council, which asked to see  rst a questionnaire  lled in by the UIA.9 0 Infor-
mation about international organizations and their representatives was also col-
lected in countries to which the occupying forces did not have access. On
several occasions agents provided by the SS investigated the numbers and
workings of international institutions based in Switzerland. Special interest was
paid to those international associations that had remained in Geneva after a
substantial portion of the of cial League of Nations family had departed. The
DKZ compiled these data into lists which, at least for those organizations com-
ing under the aegis of the propaganda ministry, were intended to be a source
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of advice for use once the war was over. In addition to these activities made
possible by the war, the DKZ continued to ful l its earlier domestic tasks, to
vet currency applications and to authorize conferences.
And yet by 1941 the DKZ had passed its zenith. Its downfall was the result,
not of failing zeal or lack of opportunities for action, but of its very success.
Already by 1940 the Foreign Of ce had ceased to be content with mere
attempts to restrain the DKZ and had initiated a debate on the question of the
place that international organizations should occupy within the National Social-
ist state and the authority to which they should be subordinated. The offensive
strategy launched by the Foreign Of ce set in motion a tussle over basic prin-
ciples: over the roˆle of internationalist ideas within a National Socialist system
that was, in the last analysis, ideologically incompatible with them, and over
the precise de nition of the nature, scope and purpose of foreign policy. In the
course of the dispute—a bizarre one to be held in the midst of war—the two
adversaries expended considerable time and energy lining up supporters and
carrying out research. Each side accumulated quantities of data, the Foreign
Of ce too now demanding a list of organizations ‘the transfer of which to
Germany appears to be urgently necessary or at least desirable’.9 1 The two
sides also had recourse to legal manoeuvres:  rst the DKZ obtained an opinion
from the (German) Institute for Foreign Public Law and International Law.9 2
Then the Foreign Of ce demanded that an inter-ministerial committee prepare
a law on international organizations in Germany, simultaneously supplying its
own draft.9 3 Henceforth the foundation of an inter-ministerial administrative
unit became an important argument in the con ict. The head of the legal
division in the propaganda ministry viewed the convening of this committee
as a further attempt by the Foreign Of ce to ‘take over the International Associ-
ation area by devious means’.9 4 Although the committee came to nothing, there
was no talk of a return to normal relations. One day after the Foreign Of ce’s
unsuccessful intervention the propaganda ministry and the DKZ made a coun-
ter-move and joined forces with the International Chamber of Law. As part of
this operation Schweig summoned Helmuth Aschenbrenner to attend a meeting
with the General Secretary of the International Chamber of Law at the head-
quarters of the UIA at rue Ducale in Brussels.9 5 Aschenbrenner edited the
Archiv fu¨r das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen ,  rst published in
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1940. Schweig himself stood behind its shifting editorial board. The plan was
that this journal should now become the publicity organ of a committee,
attached to the International Chamber of Law, that would henceforth be respon-
sible for dealing with the legal position of international organizations. An
agreement between Goebbels and Reich Minister Frank, the President of the
International Chamber of Law, con rmed the scheme.9 6 Goebbels appointed a
triumvirate to organize the committee and supervise the ‘transition’ of the jour-
nal.
To all appearances Schweig, who had previously operated somewhat on the
periphery of the propaganda ministry, was now set to make his next upwards
career move. He belonged to the triumvirate together with the heads of the
propaganda and legal divisions of the propaganda ministry.9 7
In the second volume of the Archiv, which at once attended to the new task,
the head of the DKZ  gured prominently. Immediately following the statement
by Frank came a declaration of principles signed by Schweig, calling for inter-
national organizations to be accorded a specialized legal status. Schweig wrote
two further articles for the same volume,9 8 though the second on tricky details
concerning the ‘legal situation of the international organizations in occupied
territories’ had an anonymous asterisk instead of the author’s name.9 9 The col-
laboration with the International Chamber of Law and the issuing of its own
publicity strengthened the DKZ, which according to a directive from July 1941
now also had to be informed formally about the displacement of international
organizations.1 00 Its enhanced standing, however, also attracted the interest of
the propaganda ministry. Thus, the ministry carried out an administrative
restructuring, that reinforced its own presence within the DKZ. Following a
directive from Goebbels, Ministerialdirigent Berndt informed the DKZ, which
until then had been headed by a chairman (Gutterer) and his deputy (Schweig),
that it would now be given a presidency as an executive committee. Gutterer
remained as president. Berndt (since September 1941 the new head of the
propaganda division within the propaganda ministry)1 01 became vice-president
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and Schweig executive vice-president. In addition to the presidency the DKZ
now also had a management board, on which senior of cials of the propaganda
ministry were the dominant group.1 02 The purpose of this expansion was to
eliminate clashes of responsibility within the ministry and bring together all
those with a stake in the area of international conferences, thereby thwarting
any further attempts by the Foreign Of ce to establish an inter-ministerial com-
mittee.1 0 3
With the new leadership structure, however, the real objective of the Central
Conference Of ce—acquiring extraterritorial status—became increasingly dif-
 cult to achieve. Therefore the idea of a change of Trojan horses seemed a
promising one and the DKZ came closer to the Chamber of Law. As an admit-
tedly international organization but also a National Socialist one, which did
not have a reputation of being a formerly hostile institution, the International
Chamber of Law was ideally suited as a device for internationalizing the DKZ.
Schweig therefore began to put international legal organizations based in
Belgium at the service of the International Chamber of Law.1 04 When in March
the ministry of justice put a draft law into circulation which assigned special
rights to the Chamber of Law, the situation seemed to improve appreciably.1 05
However, the attempt to set up international organizations with special extra-
territorial rights now noticeably met with resistance from the SS and the mili-
tary authorities, the DKZ’s key backers within the power structure. The SS
had already come out against the enhancement of the legal status of the Inter-
national Chamber of Law back in September 1941.1 06 The dismantling of the
plan to instrumentalize the Chamber, though, came about only when the propa-
ganda ministry itself now also acted to neutralize the DKZ. In a rare display
of unity, the opponents of the DKZ launched an operation to this effect in the
spring of 1942. Those within the propaganda ministry who favoured a compro-
mise solution with the Foreign Of ce had been gaining ground.1 07 This group,
led by Professor Hunke, wanted to exploit the power of the Central Conference
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Of ce as a means of increasing the sphere of in uence of the propaganda
ministry. They argued that the formation of an inter-ministerial committee
would ultimately give the propaganda ministry ‘thorough oversight of all plans
of the ministries that are important as far as foreign propaganda is concerned’.
With the DKZ integrated, ‘the foreign branches of the other ministries, which
hitherto have dealt solely with the Foreign Of ce, will come into close contact
with the Promi [propaganda ministry]. We shall gain increasing in uence over
the plans of these branches.’1 0 8 The DKZ, however, was going to be reinte-
grated only if it could be prevented at the eleventh hour from attaining a special
independent status in tandem with the International Chamber of Law. A move
against the Archiv, the journal jointly run by the DKZ and the Chamber, made
it markedly less likely that the DKZ would succeed. In the summer of 1942
the propaganda ministry delayed publication of the third volume,1 09 and in
September the foreign ministry demanded a right of preliminary censorship,
holding up the proofs for six weeks—a severe measure at a time when printing
lead was in short supply and eighteen printing works in Bremen had recently
been destroyed.1 1 0 A few weeks later the propaganda ministry went back to its
records and despatched two papers, written in May, to the foreign ministry,
which was now offered two positions on the DKZ’s management board.1 11 The
outcome that Schweig had sought so long to avoid, direct control over the DKZ
by the Foreign Of ce, now came to pass. The  nal crippling of the DKZ,
however, was carried out at the very highest level. A con dential directive by
the Fu¨hrer of 4 November 1942 stated that
political, cultural and professional relations with foreign government representatives,
organizations and individuals maintained by the Party, its organizations and af liated
associations are a part of German foreign policy. In order to avoid consequences that
could hinder or be damaging to the goals of the foreign policy of the Reich, it is neces-
sary that such relations come under the undivided direction of the Reich Foreign Minis-
ter, who is exclusively responsible for them to me.112
This was a broad de nition; in practice foreign policy in November 1942 was
con ned to measures relevant to the war effort. Accordingly, ‘the planning,
preparation and staging of European or international events such as conferences
and meetings or the establishment of associations etc.’ was to be ‘held over’
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or, in urgent cases, had to be approved by the foreign ministry.1 1 3 The personal
networks which the DKZ had spent so much effort building up, its relations
with foreign diplomats, the invitations of foreigners to Germany and arrange-
ments for travel abroad were also now to be handled by the Foreign Of ce.
The DKZ’s response was feverish. Schweig recognized that the Fu¨hrer’s
directive had ‘transferred to the Foreign Of ce powers that had previously
belonged exclusively to the German Central Conference Of ce’.1 14 He tried to
preserve the DKZ’s roˆle as a cover organization for exerting political in uence
in the area of international conferences. His attempt failed, however, and a
series of decrees from different agencies now placed drastic curbs on the DKZ’s
abilities to stage gatherings.1 15 By November 1942 Schweig’s position had
become an extremely dif cult one. A document issued by the military com-
mander in Belgium placed him under German military authority until 31 March
1943 as ‘Administrator for Enemy Firms’.1 1 6 In March he anticipated the pre-
dictable notice of conscription and volunteered for service with the Waffen-
SS.1 17 It seems, however, that even now the experienced tactician did not go
to war without having arranged some safeguards. Maintaining that he had ‘been
offered a similar position’ after completing front-line duty,1 1 8 Schweig left the
now powerless DKZ; a senior of cial of the propaganda ministry replaced him.
The SS, however, continued to be in charge in Brussels and Paris. The Sicher-
heitsdienst had taken over the administration of the UIA,1 1 9 and the UIA branch
of ce in Paris also came under its wing. Schweig doubtless planned, therefore,
to obtain ‘a similar position’ in either Brussels or Paris rather than in Berlin.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.: Statement of German Central Conference Of ce regarding the Fu¨hrer’s Decree of
4.11.1942, published in Reich Directive Bulletin of the NSDAP, 11.11.1942, edition A, series
45/42.
115 NA, RMVP 1936–44, T-70, roll 106, Pro.6506, 3629450: Letter from RMVP/Gutterer to
Supreme Reich Authorities, Reich Governors, Land Governments, Berlin, 14.1.1943. However,
a ban on all conferences and meetings not relevant to the war effort—with no exemption clause
for the DKZ—was not imposed until the summer of 1944: cf. NA, Micro lmed Captured Ger-
man Documents, RMVP, T-580, roll 642,  le 381: Circular Note from State Secretary Leopold
Gutterer to the Supreme Reich Authorities, Land Governments, Reich Governors, Berlin,
3.8.1944.
116 CHIDK, 1363/1/166: Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France, Chief of Mili-
tary Administration, Certi cation Valid until 31.3.1943, Brussels, 18.11.1942. The certi cation
is ‘valid only in conjunction with the SS-Fu¨hrer Identity Document no. 415,917’ (ibid.).
117 CHIDK, 1363/1/166: Sch[weig] to State Secretary Gutterer, President of the German Cen-
tral Conference Of ce, [Berlin], 5.3.1943. Schweig was ordered to report to Prague: cf. NA,
Roll List for SS Of cers, Personnel Files, micro lm publication, A3343 series SSO, roll 124B:
SS Personnel Head Of ce, 7.7.1943.
118 Ibid.
119 It did not, however, take on its expenditures, which ‘the Military Commander had met out
of the occupation expenditures ’: cf. ibid.: Pro VS/Dr Scha¨fer to Director Pro, Berlin, 8.4.1943.
91National Socialism and International Information Management
V: Concluding Remarks
Leaving aside the contingencies of historical events, two factors governed the
rise and fall of the German Central Conference Of ce. These were the tension
between competing areas of authority, and the dilemma that while access to
information was conditional upon the co-operativeness of the authorities, those
very authorities were dif cult to handle. Most of them  rmly opposed to the
idea—inherent in the DKZ’s conception of information—that the of ce should
be built up from a mere documentation agency into an independent organiza-
tion. These problems characterized all three phases of the evolution of the DKZ.
The  rst phase lasted from 1934, when a belated process of modernization
began, until the beginning of the war, as the of ce strove to strengthen the
German presence at international academic and scienti c conferences. Contrary
to what might have been expected, the outbreak of war did not pose a threat
to the DKZ; it did, though, inaugurate a clear change of gear, as the occupation
of Belgium and the capture of Paris gave the of ce access to the centres of
internationalism that had been based there since the nineteenth century. Plun-
dered  les from the occupied territories enlarged the information resources of
the DKZ. National Socialist control of the UIA enabled the DKZ to transcend
its roˆle as a merely national organization and began to open the way for it to
develop into an international one. A third phase, however, began in 1941–2,
when the leadership of the DKZ lost out to the foreign ministry in a fundamen-
tal debate on the function of international organizations within the National
Socialist state; and the military situation after defeat at Stalingrad hastened the
of ce’s downfall.
The rise of the DKZ, and the plundering it carried out in the occupied terri-
tories, are an instructive aspect of the history of the Third Reich. Of course,
a great many acts of pillage by different National Socialist organizations are
documented, involving valuable objects of all kinds—even, bizarrely, grand
pianos1 2 0—and likewise entailing a signi cant effort of logistics. The DKZ,
however, did not collect artistic or other treasures systematically. Even though
there is an obvious point of comparison with the theft of records that marks the
history of wars in general,1 2 1 the comparison applies only to those documents of
Germany’s opponents that had previously been secret. In the present case, these
constituted a small proportion of the total mass of material that was transported.
The bulk of the enormous haul consisted of information—such as the statutes
of international organizations that the DKZ so carefully  led—which was
accessible on an individual basis. This information was, however, of great
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scarcity value in its totality, as a representative picture of the evolution of
international networks. There was a remarkable degree of agreement among
the authorities of the Third Reich, in the foreign ministry as well as in the
Central Conference Of ce itself, about the importance of these networks. The
DKZ shows that National Socialist authorities tried to dissolve the contradiction
between co-operation and competition by the in uencing, instrumentalizing and
exerting of control over an extremely broad and varied group of international
networks. Those activities highlight the danger to which this element of inter-
national relations—increasingly signi cant since the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury and still not suf ciently considered by historians—remains exposed.
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